Recent research documents that ownership concentration is higher in countries with weak investor protection. However, drawing on panel data on corporate ownership in 34 countries between 1995 and 2006, we show that these market-wide characteristics bear little relation to the ownership structure of newly public firms, which almost universally list with low float. What reconciles these two stylized facts? We show that firms in countries with strong investor protection are more likely to experience decreases in ownership concentration after listing, that these decreases appear to occur in response to growth opportunities, and that they are associated with new share issuance. Therefore, one of the key reasons that ownership concentration falls as firms age following their IPO in countries with strong investor protection is that firms raise capital and grow, diluting blockholders in the process. * A previous version of this paper circulated as "The Evolution of Corporate Ownership: Evidence from 34 countries." We are grateful to David Blitzer at Standard and Poors for providing data on investable weight factors. Evie Spanos and Sonya Lai provided excellent research assistance. We thank Malcolm Baker, Mihir Desai, Paul Gompers, Randall Morck, Richard Ruback, David Scharfstein, Andrei Shleifer, and seminar participants at Harvard, HKUST Business School, Singapore Management University, University of Oregon, and University of Texas at Austin for helpful comments. The Harvard Business School Division of Research provided funding for this study.
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Recent research shows that corporate ownership is less concentrated in countries offering stronger protections to minority shareholders. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer (1999) , Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (forthcoming), and Dyck and Zingales (2004) find higher incidence of concentrated ownership among large firms in countries where the private benefits of control are high. Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) document similar patterns across firms in Asia and Europe.
We show that meaningful differences in ownership concentration do not exist for newly public firms. Immediately following the time of initial public offering, ownership tends to be fairly concentrated and does not vary significantly with institutional characteristics. Measures of institutional quality, such as investor protection, are strongly associated with more dispersed ownership only in samples of large, mature public firms, or in broad cross-sections of young and old firms.
Why does investor protection matter so much in the full cross-section, and so little for newly public firms? Mechanically, it must be due to differences in the experiences of these firms following their IPOs. After first listing on the stock market, firms in countries with better institutions become widely held at a faster rate. This is apparent in the contrast between the typical newly listed firm in the U.S. and its counterpart in Brazil. In both countries, block ownership of the median firm is about 50 percent following the IPO. However, in the US, block ownership of the median firm drops to 21 percent within five years of the IPO, while in Brazil it stays approximately constant.
We assemble new panel data on corporate ownership covering nearly 10,000 firms in 34 countries between 1995 and 2006, including nearly 3,000 firms that go public for the first time during this period. Relative to previous studies, the advantage of our data is that we observe 2 blockholdings as well as shares outstanding over the early years of the lives of these firms as public entities, rather than at a single point in time. This makes it possible to track two conceptually distinct mechanisms underlying ownership dynamics: blockholder sales, and issuance of follow-on external equity.
Previous work on corporate ownership has emphasized the agency costs facing non controlling shareholders. Zingales (1995) and Bebchuck (1999) provide theoretical explanations of why ownership is likely to be concentrated in countries where the protection of minority shareholders is weak, and where the private benefits of control are large. In these environments, controlling shareholders hold on to their shares to avoid being expropriated in a takeover or by the actions of a corporate raider.
These theories have dynamic implications. Blockholders trade off the costs of losing control with the benefits of new capital, or the benefits of risk-sharing. While these costs and benefits exist at the time that the firm first goes public, they vary considerably thereafter. This gives rise to a dynamic effect of investor protection on ownership concentration. The willingness of the owners to sell shares should depend on the growth opportunities facing the firm. In the process of raising external equity to finance these growth opportunities, blockholders become diluted, and the firm becomes more widely held. AmerisourceBergen, the leading U.S. pharmaceutical distributor that went public as AmeriSource Health in 1995, is a good example of a firm that increased its reliance on capital after going public and become widely held in the process. In the first ten years of its life in public markets, the company nearly tripled its reliance on external capital, primarily through a series of stock-based acquisitions. Partly as a consequence, between 1995 (the year our data starts) and 2006, the share of the firm controlled by blockholders fell from 69 percent to close to zero. 3 We test three predictions that follow from this dynamic agency-based view of corporate ownership. First, decreases in ownership concentration should be more likely following IPO in countries with good investor protection. Second, in countries with good investor protection, ownership concentration should fall in response to investment opportunities. Third, insofar as decreases in ownership are driven by the need to invest to pursue growth opportunities, they should be driven by primarily share issuance, rather than blockholder sales. Blockholder sales should be more likely in countries with good shareholder protection, but they should not be driven by the firm's growth opportunities.
We find support for each of these hypotheses. First, firms in countries with good investor protection tend to become widely held faster, even though ownership is concentrated for a few years around the IPO. Second, firms that have better investment opportunities are more likely to become widely held, but this effect only operates in countries where minority shareholder rights are strong and the private benefits of control are small. Third, decreases in blockholding shares that are a response to investment opportunities involve issues of new shares and not sales by blockholders. The results collectively imply that one of the key reasons that ownership concentration falls as firms age following their IPO is that firms in countries with strong investor protection raise capital and grow.
Our results have implications for work on finance and growth. If firms in countries with poor protection of minority shareholders have attractive growth opportunities, they may rely more heavily on debt to finance growth. We find evidence consistent with this. However, substitution towards debt does not imply that firms in countries with weak investor protection are unconstrained. Consistent with results surveyed in Levine (2005) , firms in our sample that are located in countries with weak investor protection increase their net property, plant, and 4 equipment by smaller amounts than firms in countries with stronger protection in response to growth opportunities. 1 We do not claim that the correlation between institutions and firm growth is novel-others have pointed out that institutional quality is linked to firms' ability to access external financing and thus growth -our contribution is linking this growth to changes in ownership concentration.
In addition to agency-based explanations of the dynamics of corporate ownership, we also consider other institutional characteristics that have been related to changes in corporate ownership. In an interesting recent paper, Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007) study the determinants of changes in the ownership concentration of U.S. firms. 2 They conclude that corporate ownership changes do not reflect agency problems facing firms but rather emphasize the role of stock market liquidity. Perhaps one reason why they do not find much of a role for agency problems is the limited variation in such problems across firms in the U.S. and the difficulties of measuring them with firm-level characteristics.
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Taking cues from their results, we ask whether the stock market liquidity variables that they uncover also help explain differences in the way ownership evolves across firms in different countries. However, this exercise is tricky because measures of liquidity could proxy for other institutional variables. It is also possible that firm measures of liquidity and ownership 5 concentration are jointly determined, thereby giving rise to endogeneity problems. Our setting allows us to exploit commonality of liquidity within industries. We compute industry measures of liquidity using NYSE data and find that these measures are significant determinants of the diffusion of ownership in other countries. This finding confirms an independent and important role for liquidity, as Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007) suggest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our data in more detail. Section II presents our country and firm level results related to agency explanations. Section III considers further implications of our findings, and Section IV discusses alternative mechanisms that could also explain the diffusion of corporate ownership. The last section concludes.
I. Data

A. Investable weight factors
We rely on a database of "investable weight factors" collected by Standard and Poors, Citigroup, and the International Finance Corporation division of the World Bank. These data have been collected with the goal of computing appropriate weights of stocks in their global index products. Most of the major global stock indexes (e.g., S&P, MSCI, Topix, FTSE) employ some degree of float weighting in index construction. The investable weight factor F is
where BH denotes the number of shares held by blockholder j of firm i and N denotes total shares outstanding. We define the blockholding share as one minus the free float, or
The underlying blockholder data are culled from a variety of national sources. Our data account for blocks owned by three types of entities, all of which are believed to hold their shares in part because of the benefits of control. They are publicly traded corporations, venture capital firms, private equity firms, and leveraged buy-out groups; government entities, at all levels of government; and current or former officers and directors of the company, founders of the company, and pension funds and employee stock ownership plans that are associated with and controlled by the company. The holdings of mutual funds, insurance companies, and independent foundations are not considered to be a part of blockholdings even if such holdings are large because these owners are not believed to be interested in exerting control. While government holdings are in principle part of these blocks, they tend to be negligible for the vast majority of firms in our sample. 4 While it is potentially interesting to disaggregate these data to understand the dynamics of ownership among different types of blockholders, our data do not allow for such a disaggregation.
Within each group of blockholders, holdings are only considered when they cumulate to over ten percent of shares outstanding. However, individual holdings below five percent of shares outstanding are ignored, except where they belong to clearly related shareholders like family members or board members. The intent of this somewhat arbitrary rule is to normalize the measure across countries, which have different thresholds at which blockholders must report their ownership shares.
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Ownership data are at the security level rather than the firm level. As a consequence, we may not accurately measure the extent to which specific owners control firms that have multiple share classes. As a robustness check, we exclude firms for which Datastream reports the existence of more than one share class that is traded in public markets. Firms with dual class structures are only a small fraction of the sample, and the results that follow apply equally to the full sample of firms as well as to the subset in which dual class firms are excluded.
Because we are not interested in changes in reported ownership concentration that are related to changes in ownership restrictions, we exclude industries in which these restrictions are prevalent, including airlines, banks, and utilities because of regulatory concerns. This is similar to the practice adopted in Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007) , who exclude banks and utilities.
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Finally, as with the data used in other studies on changes in ownership concentration, our data do not allow us to track ownership of firms that are acquired. For example, it may be that some firms become widely held by being acquired by other firms that have dispersed ownership.
Notwithstanding this, we can track ownership when a firm issues equity in an acquisition but continues to survive. This appears in our data as an increase in total shares outstanding, and it is a common form of ownership dilution.
The data limitations that are described above could induce measurement error at the firm level, and would be problematic if our sole objective were to get an accurate characterization of the cross-section of firm ownership. But our analysis focuses on explaining changes in ownership concentration. This approach reduces the impact of the limitations of commercial 8 databases, such as those described by Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) , Faccio and Lang (2002 ), Lins (2003 ), and Holderness (2007 . Data errors and omissions would only induce bias if changes in firm-level data quality were correlated with the explanatory variables. In contrast, level differences in the quality of firm-level data should not affect our inferences. We also expect our empirical approach of focusing on large changes in the blockholding share to help reduce concerns about measurement error.
B. Dynamics of Corporate Ownership: Some Examples
To provide intuition for the process by which firms become widely held in our data, it is helpful to consider some examples. As is evident in these examples, the percentage of shares outstanding held by blockholders can change for two reasons: either blockholders buy or sell, or the firm issues or repurchases outside equity. Because alternative data sources exist for Japan, the U.S., and Germany, these examples also provide a check, albeit an incomplete one, on the integrity of our data.
Our first example, Nihon Eslead, a condominium developer in Japan, is a firm for which the blockholding share decreases following the IPO primarily because of sales from the largest blockholder. The firm initially went public in October 1999, but our coverage begins in 
C. Other data
Starting with the complete database, we limit the sample to firms that can be identified on Worldscope and Datastream. These sources provide information on firm valuation that is used to compute two measures of Tobin's Q. The first of these is firm-specific-the ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt to the book value of assets for each firm in each year. While this measure should reflect opportunities faced by individual firms, it may also reflect a given firm's ability to pursue those opportunities. For example, suppose that investment opportunities in the steel industry are high, reflected in steel firms' generally high Q. However, if a firm in that industry is unable to exploit those opportunities, it may suffer from a depressed 10 market valuation and thus low Q. Thus we also use an industry measure that is computed by averaging Tobin's Q across all firms in an industry-year.
Worldscope and Datastream are also the source of many of the controls including: the log of assets, the ratio of net property plant and equipment (net PPE) to assets, the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA) to sales, the level of research and development (R&D) expenditures, the ratio of debt to assets, and the volume of shares traded. 6 We also require that each country have at least 5 firms for more than 5 years and that there is at least one firm in each country that can be tracked soon after its IPO. This is to ensure that we have a representative sample in each country. Table I summarizes our data.
In the tests that follow, we draw data from the full matched database, as well as a subset in which we can track ownership of the firm immediately after IPO. Table I shows that the IPO sample includes 18,766 firm-years, comprising 2,701 unique firms. Table II gives a breakdown of our data by country. Our data cover 34 countries: 23 of these countries are covered from 1995 onwards and the remaining 11 countries from 1998 onwards. With the exception of Argentina, which has only one firm that we can track from IPO, every other country has at least 6 firms in the IPO sample, and at least 20 firms in the full database.
Our analysis also employs several proxies for country characteristics, including two measures of investor protection. The first of these is the Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (forthcoming) anti-self-dealing index, which is a composite measure of the degree to which a country's laws protect minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders.
It updates the La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) antidirector index. 7 We refer to this variable as our legal protection variable. The second is the measure of the private benefits of control developed by Dyck and Zingales (2004) . 8 It captures, at the country level, the average premium than an acquirer pays for a controlling block. We refer to this as the block premium. One can interpret the block premium as an ex-post measure of investor protection and legal protection as an ex-ante measure of investor protection. Several tests also include a country measure of market liquidity. Stock market turnover is defined as total shares traded scaled by shares outstanding.
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Panel A of Table III summarizes the data used in the country level analysis that follows, and panels B and C summarize the data used in the firm-level analysis for the full sample and IPO sample respectively. All firm-level scaled variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
II. Main Results
A. Country-level analysis
We start by testing for a relationship between ownership concentration and investor protection at the country level. Existing cross country studies indicate that ownership concentration is higher in countries with weaker investor protection, but focus primarily on samples of mature firms. As a benchmark for our subsequent analysis, and to see if these previous results hold in our data, we isolate a sample of firms that have been public for at least 5 years in 2005 and conduct country level tests explaining differences in ownership concentration 12 that are similar to those presented in La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), Dyck and Zingales (2004) , and other papers.
Panel A of Table IV We conduct similar tests using a sample of firms that have only recently gone public.
These are shown in Panel B. We rearrange our data into IPO time, and select the first post-IPO year observation for each firm, as long as it is within 2 years of the firm's IPO. The dependent variable is the median blockholding share for firms in this sample by country. In the specification in column 3, the coefficients on the Low Legal Protection dummy and Stock
Market Turnover are not significant, and they are more than 40% smaller than the corresponding 13 coefficients in Panel A. In short, there does not appear to be a relationship between investor protection and ownership concentration for newly public firms.
To shed light on the contrast between Panel A and Panel B of Table IV, Figure 2 plots blockholding shares in IPO time for firms in countries with low and high investor protection.
The distinction between low and high investor protection is again based on the sample median value of the Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (forthcoming) anti-self-dealing index. Around the time of the IPO, the median blockholding share is high in both high and low investor protection countries. Ownership diffuses following IPO in countries with strong investor protections so that the median blockholding share falls from 60% to below 25% after 5
years. In countries with weak investor protection, however, the median blockholding share remains above 45% five years after firms are public. The figure suggests that previous results on the cross-section of ownership are in large part driven by differences in the evolution of ownership over time.
Taken together, the results thus far indicate that investor protection has an effect that accumulates through time for firms that have gone public, suggesting that such protections affect changes in ownership concentration. More formally, we estimate OLS regressions of the change in blockholdings on a set of country characteristics:
where k indexes the country and t indexes the year, and P measures investor protection. The The tests presented in Table V use the same independent variables as before. Although the coefficient on the Low Legal Protection dummy is only marginally significant in column 1, it is significant in column 3. The low investor protection dummy attracts a coefficient of -0.026, implying that decreases in median blockholding shares are 2.6 percentage points larger in countries with stronger investor protection. The magnitude of this effect is considerably larger than the one percentage point mean decrease in block holding share observed in the data. The significant 0.019 coefficient on stock market turnover implies that liquidity also affects ownership concentration.
B. Firm-level analysis
An agency based theory of corporate ownership stresses the tradeoff between the costs of losing control and the benefits of obtaining new capital. To test if this theory can explain the differences in the evolution of ownership, we turn to firm-level data. If strong investor protection reduces the cost to blockholders of losing control, then firms in these countries should be more likely to raise capital and grow, and this growth should be larger when investment opportunities are high.
Our main specification modifies the analysis in Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007) to account for our distinct hypotheses. The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to one 15 when the blockholding share decreases by at least 5%. This approach keeps the focus on large changes in ownership structure, rather than, for example, small changes that arise when managers exercise stock options. It is also appropriate given that hypotheses concerning the effects of growth opportunities on incentives to raise capital and dilute blockholders relate to decreases in ownership concentration; they have no obvious implications for increases.
Before turning to more formal regressions, it is useful to present some aggregate statistics To analyze this result more formally, we run specifications that take the following form:
where i,j,k,t denote firm, industry, country, and year, Q measures growth opportunities, P measures investor protections, and Z is a vector of controls. Each specification includes as a 16 control the blockholder share at the start of the year, because firms with a high blockholder share are more likely to experience declines (in the limit, it is not possible for firms that have no blockholders to experience decreases in block ownership). Each specification also includes year fixed effects, and a set of control variables based on Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007), as well as the log of GDP per capita.
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Standard errors are clustered by country. Turnover confirm the earlier country-level findings. Moving from a low to a high investor protection country increases the probability of a decrease in the blockholding share by 6.9
percentage points.
The regression in the first column of Table VI is essentially the firm-level analogue of the results in Table V , subjected to additional firm-level controls. For a finer test of our hypothesis, we need to estimate how ownership changes in response to investment opportunities, and how this sensitivity varies across countries. Therefore, we include in our regression the interaction of lagged Tobin's Q with our investor protection dummy variable. This is shown in the second column. The interaction term is indeed negative and significant. The 0.036 coefficient on lagged Tobin's Q, together with the -0.042 coefficient on the interaction term, imply that decreases in blockholdings occur when growth opportunities are high only in countries with strong investor protections but not in countries with weak investor protection. The differences between the estimates in the first two columns suggest that the effects of being in a country with strong 10 Our results tend to be somewhat stronger without the full suite of control variables.
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investor protection operate through differences in the way firms respond to investment opportunities.
The specifications in the next two columns vary the proxy for investor protection. Here we use a dummy variable that is equal to one for countries in which the mean block premium as measured by Dyck and Zingales (2004) is above the median across countries in our sample. The -0.221 coefficient on this variable in column 3 implies that moving from a country with a high block premium to a country with a low block premium increases the probability of a large decrease in block ownership share by about 7.6 percentage points. The results presented in column 4 indicate that when we include the interaction of the High Block Premium dummy and lagged Tobin's Q, the coefficient on this variable is negative and significant, the coefficient on the High Block Premium Dummy on its own becomes insignificant, and the coefficient on Lagged Tobin's Q increases slightly. Thus, we get broadly similar results for the interaction term with this alternate, ex-post measure of investor protection.
In the specifications presented in columns 5-8, we replace the firm specific measures of Tobin's Q with a global industry measure of Tobin's Q. This alternative formulation of Q is less likely to reflect the ability of firms to pursue growth opportunities and more likely to capture the world-wide attractiveness of investment opportunities different industries. The results here are similar.
The results in Table VI suggest that liquidity has an effect on ownership diffusion that is independent from the effects of shareholder protection. In column 1, Stock Market Turnover attracts a coefficient of 0.172, implying that a one standard deviation increase in Stock Market
Turnover is associated with a 3.2 percentage point increase in the probability of a drop in the blockholding share.
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The effects of many of the firm level controls included in Table VI resemble 
Where BH denotes the split adjusted shares held by blockholders, and N denotes shares outstanding. The first term on the right hand side of equation (5) One straightforward way to study different kinds of decreases in blockholding shares is to sort incidents in which the blockholding share drops by 5 percent or more into two groups: those that are primarily due to blockholder sales, and those that are primarily due to share issuance.
We code a dummy variable equal to one if the decrease in blockholding share is greater 5 percent and if the second term on the right-hand-side of equation (5) is positive. Thus, this dummy captures incidents in which a decrease in the blockholding share is at least partially driven by new issuance. We also code a dummy variable equal to one if the decrease in blockholding share is greater than five percent and if the second term on the right-hand-side of equation (5) is zero or negative. This variable captures decreases in ownership concentration that are driven by blockholder sales without additional equity issuance. By definition, these two dummy variables add up to the dummy variable that is analyzed in Figure 3 and Table VI .
Panels B and C of Figure 3 illustrate the extent to which decreases in the blockholding share can be attributed to new issues or to block sales. We first sort firms into groups based on A somewhat more formal analysis is presented in Table VII . The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is a dummy that is equal to one if the decrease in block holding share is greater than 5% and if the decrease is at least partially a consequence of share issuance. The dependent variable used in columns 5-8 is a dummy that is equal to one if the decrease in block holding share is greater than 5% and equity issuance is zero or negative. The coefficients on the investor protection variables in columns 1 and 3 are negative and significant. The coefficients on Tobin's Q are positive and significant in columns 1-4. Columns 2 and 4 include the interaction of 21 Tobin's Q and the Low Legal Protection dummy and the High Block Premium dummy respectively, and the coefficients on these interaction terms are negative and significant. Thus, in countries with strong investor protection, firms are more likely to become widely held because they are issuing equity to pursue growth opportunities.
The negative coefficients on Low Legal Protection in column 5 and High Block Premium in column 7 indicate that decreases in the block holding share that are a consequence of blockholders selling to diffuse owners are more common in countries with strong investor protection. However, the results in columns 6 and 8 indicate that the coefficients on these country characteristics interacted with measures of growth opportunities are insignificant.
We turn briefly to the control variables, which provide some additional color on ownership diffusion. Stock market turnover influences issuance in all of the regressions, but only comes in significantly in the first four. Decreases in blockholding that are in part a consequence of share issuance (but not those that are only a consequence of block holding sales) are more common in countries with more liquid markets. When looking only at incidents where blockholders sell without changes in shares outstanding we do not find any relation with past returns. The coefficient on leverage is positive and significant in the specifications presented in columns 1-4, but not 5-8. This is consistent with the view that firms with high leverage lack access to additional debt and are likely to finance growth with equity instead.
Finally, we consider some robustness issues. First, the types of firms that go public may differ across countries. For example, perhaps firms that are less likely to be affected by weak institutions in the first place may be more willing to go public in these countries. This type of selection would probably attenuate our results. A closely related concern is that firms that go public in countries with poor investor protection and illiquid markets are perhaps larger than 22 firms that go public in more developed markets. Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) present evidence that Italian firms are larger and older than US firms at the time of their IPO. This could imply that firms in countries with weak investor protections are less needy for capital following their IPO, thus reducing the extent to which blockholders are diluted by secondary share issuance. We can alter our empirical specifications to allow for this possibility-we include the initial equity market capitalization as a proxy for firm size at the time of their IPO in the firmlevel specifications considered above. Our results are not meaningfully affected by this control.
We have interpreted the estimates of the coefficients on the interaction of Tobin's Q and proxies for investor protection as evidence that large decreases in blockholding when investment opportunities are good are more likely in countries with strong as opposed to weak investor protections. However, if market liquidity is correlated with investor protection, the coefficient on the interaction terms could indicate how ownership concentration responds differently to investment opportunities in countries with different levels of liquidity. We address this possibility by including measures of Tobin's Q interacted measures of liquidity in our main tests.
The coefficient on this interaction term is insignificant, and its inclusion does not have a material
impact on the variables of interest.
III. Further Implications
Firms in countries with weak investor protections are reluctant to issue new shares and dilute the control of blockholders when growth opportunities are attractive. Perhaps these firms rely more heavily on debt financing, allowing blockholders to maintain effective control, while still allowing the firm to raise some capital. We briefly consider this possibility here. 23 We try to keep the analysis as close as possible in spirit to our baseline specification in Table VI . The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if leverage, defined as the ratio of the book value of debt to assets, increases by more than five percentage points. 11 The specifications that follow use industry measures of Tobin's Q to proxy for growth opportunities and therefore are similar to those in columns 5-8 of Table VI . The results in column 1 and 3 of Table VIII indicate that increases in leverage are not significantly related to growth opportunities and appear unrelated to investor protection. When interactions of proxies for weak investor protection and Tobin's Q are included, however, as in columns 2 and 4, the coefficient on this interaction is positive and significant. This finding implies that firms in countries with weak investor protection tend to increase leverage more than firms in countries with strong investor protection when attractive growth opportunities are present.
A number of papers document a relationship between financial development and country-, industry-, and firm-level growth. These findings suggest that even though we find firms in countries with weak shareholder protection substituting towards debt to finance growth opportunities, this substitution is incomplete. Put differently, firms in these countries raise less financing overall, and invest less. Levine (2005) surveys this work. While it is not our intention to reinvent the wheel in that extensive literature, it is worth noting that our results also have implications for investment. We can use our main specification from Table VI to understand the determinants of changes in PPE. Growth in net PPE is measured as the change in net PPE scaled by average PPE over the year. The results of these tests appear in Table IX . We find that growth in net PPE is higher for firms in industries with higher Tobin's Q, and lower for firms in countries with poor investor protection. Firms in countries with poor investor protection increase their net PPE by smaller amounts than firms in countries with strong investor protection in 11 Similar results obtain if one analyzes continuous measures of leverage increases in a Tobit specification.
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response to more attractive investment opportunities. Environments associated with decreases in the blockholding share are not only associated with growth in the number of shares outstanding, but also growth in tangible assets. In untabulated regressions, we find nearly identical results for asset growth, a broad measure of investment. These results are reminiscent of Demirgic-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) .
IV. Alternative Mechanisms Explaining the Diffusion of Ownership
We have focused so far on the tradeoff that blockholders face between maintaining control and obtaining capital. Other mechanisms, however, could play a role in explaining the diffusion of ownership. In this section, we consider two additional explanations. The first emphasizes the role of liquidity; the second, market timing.
Liquidity would have an effect on ownership concentration if insiders would like to sell shares but are reluctant to do so because such sales would put significant pressure on the stock price.
12 Bhide (1993) suggests that stock market liquidity is one reason why the U.S. has so many widely held firms. Maug (1998) shows that large shareholders should hold smaller stakes when the market is more liquid. Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007) When applied to our data, the liquidity theory has a straightforward prediction: ownership concentration should fall faster following a firm's IPO when the stock trades in a more liquid market. Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz (2007) show that investors trade more following periods of high returns, so liquidity considerations also predict decreases in ownership concentration 12 Bolton and Von Thadden (1998) point out that liquidity could also facilitate dispersion for reasons related to corporate governance. Greater liquidity could make it easier for takeovers to occur, thus increasing the role of the market for corporate control in ensuring that firms are well run and reducing the need for concentrated owners to exert control.
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following high returns. Consistent with these theories, and consistent with Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007), the results in Table VI indicate that decreases in blockholding shares are more likely in countries with liquid markets and following periods in which the stock has experienced of high returns. We also replicate the results in Table VI using a firm-level measure of turnover, getting similar results to Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007) . But firm-and country-level turnover may be endogenous. A closely held firm may be illiquid precisely because the firm is closely held. We address this by using an instrument for firm-level turnover that is based on the average turnover of firms in the same industry in the US. When liquidity is high in technology intensive sectors in the U.S., for example, it also tends to be high in these sectors in other countries. It is therefore possible to use industry measures to proxy for firm measures. As industry measures of turnover, we compute, on an annual basis, the industry value weighted average ratio of shares traded to shares outstanding for U.S. firms that listed on the NYSE. 13 This industry measure also has a positive and significant coefficient in explaining decreases in ownership concentration in specifications like those presented in Table VI .
Another theory that may explain the dynamics of ownership is market timing. Market timing says that changes in corporate ownership reflect blockholders' and managers' explicit attempts to time the equity market. Two thirds of the CFOs surveyed in Graham and Harvey (2001) identify the extent to which equity is "overvalued or undervalued" as an important consideration in the decision to issue external equity. Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) and Kim and Weisbach (2007) find that firms use only a fraction of the funds they raise for investment, suggesting that market timing play a role in new issues.
Our results in Table VI indicate that decreases in the blockholding share are more likely following periods of high firm specific market returns. The 0.070 coefficient on lagged firmlevel stock returns in Table VI implies that a one standard deviation increase in this variable is associated with a 2.3 percentage point greater likelihood of a decrease in the blockholding share.
However, the results in Table VII indicate that past returns operate through decreases in blockholding shares involving new share issues, not sales by blockholders. The coefficient on lagged firm returns is negative and insignificant in explaining decreases in the blockholding share that are a consequence of blockholder sales to diffuse owners. This result casts doubt on market timing explanations, because blockholders stand to gain more from timing the sale of their own shares, compared to the gain from new issues. Additional tests indicate that decreases in blockholding shares are not predictive of low future returns (not tabulated here). Taken together, our results suggest that decreases in blockholding shares take place when past returns and current valuations are high, but these decreases do not predict that firm valuations in the marketplace will revert to lower levels. In sum, market timing receives only limited support.
V. Conclusions
The ownership concentration of newly public firms is high and does not vary significantly with institutional characteristics. We study how the structure of corporate ownership of a firm evolves following first listing, and how this evolution varies across countries. In countries with strong investor protection, firms become widely held more quickly.
Why? In these countries, firms with growth opportunities are more likely to issue equity, diluting their blockholders in the process. Blockholders are also unconditionally likely to sell. As a result, firms in environments with poor investor protection grow less, and when they do use external 27 finance to fund growth, they lean more heavily on debt. Complementing these main findings, we also detect a role for stock market liquidity -at both the firm and market level -in helping explain the diffusion of corporate ownership. Thus, blockholders are more likely to sell, and firms are more likely to issue equity, when there is a liquid market for their shares. Taken together, our results suggest that a more dynamic view of corporate ownership is required to fully account for the patterns in the data. 
Figure 3. The Incidence of Decreases in Blockholding Shares
This figure displays the incidence of decreases in blockholding shares that exceed 5% for firms in different countries that face different growth opportunities. Panel A displays the incidence of all decreases; panel B displays the incidence of decreases that involve new share issuance; and panel C displays the incidence of decreases that are solely due to blockholder sales Table II All firms for which data on the blockholding share is available, summarized by country. For each country, the table reports the first year the country is covered by the data, the number of firms in the IPO sample, the number of firm-years in the IPO sample, the number of firms in the full sample, and the number of firm-years in the full sample. Panel A shows country characteristics. These include the median blockholding share computed in 2005; the median blockholding share computed within one year of the year the firm went public; the median blockholding share in 2005; the anti-self-dealing index drawn from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (forthcoming); Stock Market Turnover, which measures the total value of stocks traded to the total number of shares outstanding is taken from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006); and log of per-capita GDP expressed in US dollars. Panel B summarizes dependent variables as well as firm-year characteristics used in the firm-level regressions. The blockholding share is the percentage of the firm's equity controlled by blockholder; the decrease in blockholding share dummy takes a value of one if this drops by five percent; (BH/N*(ΔN/N))>0 is a dummy when the drop in the blockholding share involves equity issuance; (BH/N*(ΔN/N))≤0 is a dummy when the drop in the blockholding share is due to block sales; the change in leverage dummy takes a value of one if leverage increases by more than five percent; change in net ppe is measured as a percentage of average ppe between last year and the current year; Tobin's Q is lagged and measured at the firmor industry-year level; turnover and stock returns are measured each year; Net PPE is a firm's net property plant and equipment. EBITDA is a firm's earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation; R&D refers to research and development expenditures, and the R&D dummy is equal to one for firms that report positive levels of R&D. All scaled variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to remove the influence of outliers. 
Sample construction by country
Summary Statistics: Country and Firm Level Characteristics
Country Characteristics and Blockholdings
The dependent variable is the median decrease in blockholdings, as a percentage of shares outstanding, in each country-year. Low Legal Protection is a dummy equal to one if the anti-self-dealing index drawn from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (forthcoming) is below its sample median of 0.47. Stock Market Turnover is the ratio of the value of stocks traded to the total number of shares outstanding, and it is taken from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) . T-statistics based on standard errors that are clustered at the country-level and are shown in parentheses. (***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.)
Decreases in Blockholding Share
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Growth Opportunities and Decreases in Blockholding Shares
This table presents probit specifications that explain decreases in blockholding shares. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes on a value of one when the blockholding share decreases by more than 5 percent. Low Legal Protection is a dummy equal to one if the anti-selfdealing index drawn from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (forthcoming) is below its sample median and otherwise equal to zero. High Block Premium is a dummy equal to one if the block premium, as measured in Dyck and Zingales (2004) , exceeds its sample median. In columns 1-4, Tobin's Q is measured as the ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt to the book value of assets, and in columns 5-8, it is measured by taking means of this ratio across all firms in the same industry and year. Stock Market Turnover measures the total value of stocks traded to the total number of shares outstanding. Lagged Firm Level Stock Returns are in local currency terms. Net PPE is a firm's net property plant and equipment. EBITDA is a firm's earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation. R&D refers to research and development expenditures, and the R&D dummy is equal to one for firms that report positive levels of R&D. Z-statistics based on standard errors that are clustered at the country-level are shown in parentheses. (***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.)
Decrease in Blockholding Share Dummy Dependent Variable: (2004), exceeds its sample median. In columns 1-2 and 5-6, Tobin's Q is measured as the ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt to the book value of assets, and in columns 3-4 and 7-8, it is measured by taking means of this ratio across all firms in the same industry-year. Stock Market Turnover measures the total value of stocks traded to the total number of shares outstanding. Lagged Firm Level Stock Returns are in local currency. Net PPE is a firm's net property plant and equipment. EBITDA is a firm's earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation. R&D refers to R&D expenditures, and the R&D dummy is equal to one for firms that report positive levels of R&D and zero otherwise. Each specification includes country fixed effects. Z-statistics based on standard errors that are clustered at the country-level are shown in parentheses. (***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.)
Decrease in Blockholding Share Dummy (1) (2) (3) 
Growth Opportunities and Increases in Leverage
This table displays the results of probit specifications that explain increases in leverage. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes on a value of one when leverage, defined as the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of assets, increases by more than 5 percent. Low Legal Protection is a dummy equal to one if the anti-self-dealing index drawn from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (forthcoming) is below its sample median. High Block Premium is a dummy equal to one if the block premium, as measured in Dyck and Zingales (2004) , exceeds its sample median. In columns 1-4, Tobin's Q is measured as the ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt to the book value of assets, and in columns 5-8, it is measured by taking means of this ratio across all firms in the same industry and year. Stock Market Turnover measures the total value of stocks traded to the total number of shares outstanding. Lagged Firm Level Stock Returns are in local currency terms. Net PPE is a firm's net property plant and equipment. EBITDA is a firm's earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation. R&D refers to R&D expenditures, and the R&D dummy is equal to one for firms that report positive levels of R&D. Z-statistics based on standard errors that are clustered at the country-level are shown in parentheses. (***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.) (2004), exceeds its sample median and otherwise equal to zero. In columns 1-4, Tobin's Q is measured as the ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt to the book value of assets, and in columns 5-8, it is measured by taking means of this ratio across all firms in the same industry and year. Stock Market Turnover measures the total value of stocks traded to the total number of shares outstanding. Lagged Firm Level Stock Returns are in local currency terms. Net PPE is a firm's net property plant and equipment. EBITDA is a firm's earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation. R&D refers to R&D expenditures, and the R&D dummy is equal to one for firms that report positive levels of R&D. T-statistics based on standard errors that are clustered at the country-level are shown in parentheses. (***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.)
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